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FOR TEXAS, NOW IS THE TIME TO FORCE 
GROUNDWATER OWNERS TO ACCOMMODATE 
HILARY SOILEAU 
I. Introduction 
Groundwater is extremely important to the American economy and 
lifestyle, supplying approximately twenty percent of the nation’s water used 
in 2010.1 While the main uses of groundwater are irrigation and public 
supply, groundwater also accounts for ninety-eight percent of domestic 
water withdrawals, primarily supplying rural areas via personal water 
wells.2  
Legal scholars have long determined that geography is a valid 
consideration in water law principles.3 Settlers of the American West 
understood that obtaining water was necessary for survival, and maintaining 
access to water required a unique system of water rights premised on the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Nancy L. Barber, Summary of Estimated Water Use in the United States in 2010, 
U.S. Geological Survey (Nov. 4, 2014, 3:38 PM), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2014/3109/pdf/ 
fs2014-3109.pdf (noting that Texas is the second-largest consumer of water out of all fifty 
states). 
 2. For 2005, most of the fresh groundwater withdrawals, sixty-eight percent, were for 
irrigation, while another nineteen percent was used for public-supply purposes, mainly to 
supply drinking water to much of the nation's population. Groundwater Use in the United 
States, U.S. Geological Survey (July 30, 2015 2:17 PM) 
http://water.usgs.gov/edu/wugw.html. 
 3. In the eastern United States, where water is more abundant, the riparian doctrine 
allows a property owner with access to waterways to make “reasonable use” of the water. In 
the western United States, however, where water is more scarce, water rights are dependent 
upon first-come-first-served administrative appropriation of a quantity of water if and when 
that water is available from the requested source. GREGORY S. WEBER, JENNIFER L. HARDER, 
& BENNETT L. BEARDEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 2–10 (9th ed. 2014). 
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ability to divert the water from a flowing stream.4 State governments 
eventually regulated this process to ensure that senior water users 
maintained their rights and to reserve water for statutorily deemed 
beneficial uses.5 In the arid West where less surface water was available, 
scientific and technological advancements in water wells and pumps6 have 
created a larger supply of water to meet the ever-growing demand.7 
Despite its utility, groundwater remained a mystical concept to humans 
until the advent of groundwater modeling, which engineers use to simulate 
and predict aquifer conditions; nonetheless, these modeling systems output 
inconsistent results, and laymen may still be unaware of the engineering 
required to extract groundwater or the natural replenishment of the 
underground source.8 Unlike surface water, groundwater is primarily 
hidden from plain sight and decidedly fugitive in nature.9 These 
characteristics create difficulty in predicting groundwater’s movement 
(regarding both direction and speed).10 Considering that annual recharge 
and long-term accumulation determine the water supply, difficulties also 
exist in predicting  groundwater availability.11  
Further, unlike surface water, which only requires a dredged ditch to 
divert the flow, utilization of groundwater requires far greater expenses to 
drill wells and install pumps.12 The long-term, continuous pumping may 
result in groundwater depletion when extraction rates exceed replenishment 
rates.13 The depletion decreases water quality and increases pumping costs 
and land subsidence.14 In Texas, recurring drought and population growth 
compound these problems; further, Texas treats groundwater as a private 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 376. 
 7. Groundwater Use in the United States, supra note 2. 
 8. See, e.g., WEBER, HARDER, & BEARDEN, supra note 3 at 371; Sorenson v. Lower 
Niobrara Natural Res. Dist., 376 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Neb. 1985) (stating that models are 
“vulnerable to ‘garbage in, garbage out,’” meaning that a model is “only as good as the 
validity of the data supplied”). 
 9. See, e.g., Fugitive Resource, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Mineral, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 10. WEBER, HARDER, & BEARDEN, supra note 3 at 372 (stating that groundwater flow is 
concededly slower than surface water flow). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Groundwater Depletion, U.S. Geological Survey (Dec. 9, 2015 12:50 PM) 
http://water.usgs.gov/edu/gwdepletion.html 
 14. Id. 
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property interest, allowing owners to sever it from the surface above it.15 In 
response, Texas has developed a unique groundwater management system 
comprised of conservation districts that enforce consumption caps, evaluate 
use efficiency, and measure groundwater levels.16 
But because policymakers cannot easily perceive groundwater and its 
depletion, water conservation policies in Texas have developed slowly. The 
Texas Groundwater District Act of 1949 gave authority to water districts to 
manage groundwater conservation.17 The High Plains Underground Water 
Conservation District No. 1, created in 1951, was the first such district and 
has evolved over the last half a century into the most active conservation 
district in the state.18 By the 1950s, Texas common law had adopted 
groundwater policies that were not conducive to conservation because 
courts based decisions on oil and gas case law that Texas had previously 
developed. These concepts, such as the rule of capture, encourage full 
development of the resource rather than conservation.19  
Still, the application of oil and gas principles to groundwater, while 
based on convenience and familiarity, is logical when considering the 
similarities between subsurface mineral resources and groundwater. 
Groundwater extraction is more similar to oil and gas extraction than to 
surface water diversion.20 Property owners may sever groundwater rights, 
like mineral rights, from surface rights.21 In Texas, groundwater wells are 
also subject to regulations similar to those imposed upon oil and gas wells, 
including well registration with local groundwater conservation districts, 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Ronald Kaiser & Frank F. Skillern, Deep Trouble: Options for Managing the 
Hidden Threat of Aquifer Depletion in Texas, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV. 249, 250-251 (2001). 
 16. Sandra Postel, Drought Hastens Groundwater Depletion in the Texas Panhandle, 
National Geographic (July 24, 2014) http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2014/07/24/ 
drought-hastens-groundwater-depletion-in-the-texas-panhandle/. 
 17. Behnaz Bolhassani, Groundwater Management Policy in Texas: Challenges and 
Recommendations, Texas Water Policy, 12 (Dec. 6, 2014) 
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/54c15aa8e4b08b9c092063a6/t/54d01bb4e4b0a76a040f
2382/1422924724333/RP-Bolhassini.pdf. 
 18. Postel, supra note 16, See also Groundwater Conservation District Facts, Texas 
Water Development Board (2015) http://www.twdb.texas.gov/groundwater/conservation_ 
districts/facts.asp.  
 19. The rule of capture states that the person to capture the resource owns the resource; 
because this policy is not conducive to groundwater conservation, which is generally 
considered a priority in western states with arid climates, Texas remains the only western 
state in which the rule of capture applies to groundwater. Bolhassani, supra note 17. 
 20. Oil and Gas Production Activities, Tribal Energy and Environmental Information, 
http://teeic.indianaffairs.gov/er/oilgas/activities/act/index.htm. 
 21. Ask Larry_Groundwater Rights, Texas Rural Water Association (July 23, 2014) 
http://www.trwa.org/?300. 
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well construction standards, spacing and reporting requirements, and 
production limits.22 With Texas’ wealth of developed oil and gas case law, 
courts have reasonably applied oil and gas principles to groundwater. 
Although case law has applied other oil and gas principles to 
groundwater, courts have never applied the accommodation doctrine that 
way. Texas applies the accommodation doctrine to severed mineral estates 
and allows the surface owners to recover damages if the mineral owner’s 
use of the surface unreasonably damages the surface despite the existence 
of reasonable alternatives that would not damage the property.23  
Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v. The City of Lubbock presents the Texas 
Supreme Court with the opportunity to employ the doctrine regarding 
severed groundwater estates. As a prerequisite, application of the 
accommodation doctrine also requires an adoption of the view that the 
groundwater estate is the dominant estate and the surface estate is the 
servient estate, with the accommodation doctrine serving as a negotiation 
between the interests of each estate holder. Court interpretations favoring 
the view of the severed groundwater estate as a private property interest 
rather than a natural resource to be conserved, along with the relative youth 
of the body of regulations governing groundwater, have weakened the 
authority of water districts. A decision favoring the accommodation 
doctrine’s applicability to groundwater could both protect the property 
owner and encourage a legislative stance on smart groundwater production 
and resource development.  
II. Law before the case 
For over 100 years, Texas courts have applied oil and gas doctrines to 
groundwater. In 1904, the Supreme Court of Texas applied the rule of 
capture to groundwater.24 A railroad company owned property in fee simple 
and drilled water wells on the land for use by its locomotives.25 The 
railroad’s new wells depleted the supply of preexisting wells on an adjacent 
homestead, but the Court found that the railroad should have free and 
absolute use of the water that would flow out of the railroad’s wells.26 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Russell S. Johnson, Groundwater Law and Regulation, Texas Bar CLE, http:// 
www.texasbarcle.com/materials/Special/Excerpt%20from%20Groundwater%20Law%20and
%20Regulation.pdf.  
 23. Andrew M. Miller, A Journey Through Mineral Estate Dominance, the 
Accommodation Doctrine, and Beyond: Why Texas is Ready to Take the Next Step with a 
Surface Damage Act, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 461, 484 (2003). 
 24. Hous. & Tex. Cent. R.R. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (1904).  
 25. Id. at 280. 
 26. Id. 
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Should the railroad’s use of groundwater exhaust the source, the railroad 
would not be liable unless the consumption was malicious or 
unreasonable.27 Only an adjoining landowner’s equal rights to absolute use 
of the reserve beneath the adjacent property can limit the absolute free use 
of the groundwater that flows out of land.28 The Court reasoned that, like oil 
and gas,29 groundwater is a fugitive resource,30 the movement and origin of 
which is a mystery; therefore, recognition of a correlative right would 
interfere with the property rights of adjacent lots owned by farmers, 
ranchers, railways, roads, sanitation plants, and domestic users.31 
The rule of capture is an equitable doctrine: it considers the limitations of 
determining the amount from an underground reservoir that should vest in 
each surface owner above the reservoir.32 “[W]e need not, therefore, pause 
to consider the scope of the legislative authority to regulate the exercise of 
mining rights and to direct the methods of their enjoyment so as to prevent 
the infringement by one miner of the rights of others.”33 Thus, the 
unpredictable nature of fugitive resources such as oil, natural gas, or 
groundwater precludes liability for reasonable use. Texas remains the only 
western state to have applied the rule of capture to groundwater.34 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. at 282. 
 28. Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 942 (Tex. 1935) (quoting 
Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 202) (“But there is a coequal right among them 
all to take from a common source of supply.”). 
 29. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corporation, 300 U.S. 55, 71–72 (1937) 
(explaining that oil and gas will migrate from high pressure areas underground to low 
pressure areas, with an indifference as to whether or not transportation pipelines are already 
established above those low pressure areas and as to who owns the areas to which the 
resources are traveling). 
 30. Mineral, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A mineral in liquid or 
gaseous form that is capable of migrating from one place to another and that one must 
reduce to possession to acquire ownership of.”). 
 31. East, 81 S.W. at 281. 
 32. Texas Oil and Gas Property Rights, Bearden Law Firm, 8 http://www.beardenlaw 
firm.com/Texas%20Oil%20and%20Gas.pdf. 
 33. Brown, 83 S.W.2d at 942 (quoting Ohio Oil Company, 177 U.S. at 202 (quoting Del 
Monte Mining & Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining & Milling Co., 171 U.S. 55, 60 
(1898))). 
 34. Everything You Need to Know About the Rule of Capture, CourthouseDirect (Aug. 
19, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://info.courthousedirect.com/blog/everything-you-need-to-know-
about-the-rule-of-capture; See generally Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America, Inc., 1 
S.W.3d 75 (1999) (affirming over ninety years of application of the common law rule of 
capture despite technological advances allowing a more accurate prediction of quantity and 
movement of groundwater); Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21 
(Tex. 1978) (holding that, in addition to the exceptions to the rule of capture adopted in 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
470 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 1 
  
In response to the Court’s application of the rule of capture to 
groundwater, the Texas legislature authorized the Railroad Commission to 
regulate groundwater production through permitting, spacing, pooling, 
unitization, prorating, etc.; used effectively, these regulations prevent 
waste, overproduction, and unfair drilling practices.35 Courts still permit 
actions to prevent malicious or wanton conduct, such as waste.36  
In addition, Texas’ Water Code “recognizes that a landowner owns the 
groundwater below the surface of the landowner’s land,” which 
conceptually is the same as ownership in place.37 As recently as 2012, the 
Supreme Court of Texas applied the theory of ownership in place to 
groundwater.38 The Court held that the Texas Constitution’s takings clause 
applies to groundwater and requires adequate compensation in exchange for 
consumption.39 The court reasoned that, while the rule of capture 
recognized ownership of groundwater at the surface after being pumped, it 
would not be antithetical to ownership of groundwater in place.40 A 
landowner of a fugitive resource still has the right to exclude by preventing 
drilling or otherwise entering the subsurface, and if the adjacent owner is 
producing, the subsurface owner can drill an offset well to capture his 
proportionate share.41 This ability to exclude further demonstrates that the 
landowner’s right to the oil and gas beneath his land is “an exclusive and 
private property right.”42 Although this holding reinforced individual 
property rights, it diminished the role of the Edwards Aquifer Authority and 
other similar water management districts, and it demonstrated a disconnect 
                                                                                                                 
East—wanton waste or malicious injury—a third exception exists where a landowner’s 
negligence while pumping causes subsidence). 
 35. See, e.g., Brown, 83 S.W.2d at 938, 941, 944; Oil & Gas Division, Railroad 
Commission of Texas (July 20, 2015, 12:17 PM), http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about-
us/organization-activities/divisions-of-the-rrc/oil-gas-division/; TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 
81.051 (Vernon 1978). 
 36. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012). 
 37. Id. at 832; TEX. WATER CODE § 36.002. 
 38. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 830; but see 1-2 EUGENE KUNTZ & OWEN ANDERSON, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS §2.4 (2015) (contrasting the two major theories of 
ownership—where the rule of capture grants ownership of all substances under land, the 
exclusive-right-to-take grants exclusive right to capture any substance below the land and 
only grants ownership once the substance is subject to capture and control). 
 39. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 817 (citing Tex. Const. art. I, § 17(a)) (“No person’s property 
shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate 
compensation being made.”). 
 40. Id. at 826.  
 41. Id. at 830. 
 42. Id. at 829 (quoting Tex. Co. v. Daughtery, 176 S.W. 717, 720 (Tex. 1915)). 
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between the courts and the legislature regarding the priority level of 
conserving water.43 
The case law applying the rule of capture and ownership in place to 
groundwater evolved from fact patterns where the landowner asserted 
property rights in the groundwater beneath said landowner’s surface, but an 
owner may sever these two estates. Severance of a mineral estate occurs 
when the surface owner conveys the surface land but reserves all or a 
portion of the mineral rights (or vice versa).44 Without explicitly stating that 
the transfer includes surface rights only (or mineral rights only), the two 
estates would transfer together.45 When this severance occurs, the 
accommodation doctrine may affect a mineral owner’s property rights. 
As of yet, courts have not applied the accommodation doctrine to 
groundwater. In Texas, the Supreme Court established the doctrine’s 
application to oil and gas in 1971.46 A landowner purchased a tract of land 
subject to prior mineral leases across the entire property.47 The landowner 
subsequently drilled irrigation wells and installed a sprinkler system 
consisting of connected pipes raised seven feet in the air to irrigate the 
entire property with greater efficiency and less labor resources.48 After the 
installation of the irrigation system, an oil and gas lessee drilled two 
additional wells on the property with pumping units ranging from seventeen 
to thirty-four feet high, thus prohibiting use of the self-propelled irrigation 
system.49 The landowner sued for an injunction to restrain the lessee from 
using the vertical space for the pumping units, which inhibited the 
automatic sprinklers and consequently depreciated the value of the property 
based on a decrease in production potential.50 
 The Court applied the accommodation doctrine, which states that if a 
lessee’s actions are impeding on a preexisting use of the surface and 
reasonable alternatives to the lessee’s actions exist, then the lessee must 
adapt to accommodate the surface owner.51 The burden of proof falls on the 
surface owner (servient estate) to show that the pumping units were not 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Bolhassani, supra note 17 at 14. 
 44. Oil & Gas Exploration and Surface Ownership, Railroad Commission of Texas 
(Sept. 9, 2015, 10:37 AM), http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about-us/resource-center/faqs/oil-gas-
exploration-and-surface-ownership/.  
 45. Id.  
 46. Getty Oil Company v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971). 
 47. Id. at 620. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 619–20. 
 51. Id. at 622. 
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reasonably necessary.52 Two other operators on the landowner’s property 
had adapted their pumping units to allow maximum use of the irrigation 
system—one by placing the pumping units in concrete cellars and the other 
by using hydraulic pumping units that were less than seven feet tall.53 Based 
on the availability of these alternatives, the Court found that it was not 
reasonably necessary for the lessee to install pumping units that impede on 
the irrigation system, even if that particular type of pumping unit was more 
economical than the two alternatives used by the other producers on the 
land.54 
 Ownership of real property includes the rights to use the surface and that 
which is below and above it. But, once a conveyance severs the subsurface 
from the surface, the accommodation doctrine recognizes that the surface 
owner should maintain the full rights to the surface and the space above it 
as needed for most effective use.55 The mineral estate, as the 
dominant estate, may use as much of the premises as is reasonably 
necessary to produce minerals, but this right must be exercised with due 
regard for the rights of the servient surface estate.56 Thus, the lessor must 
first prove that the lessee’s use of the surface substantially impaired the 
lessor’s existing use; only then are the reasonable alternatives to the 
lessee’s actions even considered.57 For example, in Merriam v. XTO, a 
landowner managing a cattle operation leased to an oil and gas operator.58 
The operator proposed a well location that the surface owner insisted would 
interfere with the cattle roundup, but the lessee drilled the well anyway, and 
the surface owner sought permanent injunction based on the 
accommodation doctrine.59 The surface owner could not prove that moving 
his temporary corrals from the location near the well to a new location on 
the same tract would substantially impair his cattle operation.60 The 
Supreme Court of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the oil and 
gas operator.61  
In 1982, the state legislature expanded the common law accommodation 
doctrine in the Texas Natural Resources Code, allowing surface owners to 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id. at 623. 
 53. Id. at 620. 
 54. Id. at 621. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 407 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. 2013). 
 58. Id. at 247. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 251. 
 61. Id. at 252. 
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limit mineral estate owners’ use of surface based on future development of 
the land.62 Per Section 92.002, surface owners may apply to the Railroad 
Commission of Texas to have land designated as a “qualified subdivision,” 
which requires the surface tract of less than 640 acres (A) located in a 
county with a population greater than 400,000 or adjacent to such a county, 
(B) subdivided in compliance with zoning orders (residential, industrial, or 
commercial), and (C) containing at least an eighty acre tract for oil and gas 
operations.63 This regulation balances Texas’ need for full utilization of 
land resources in response to the state’s significant population growth with 
the goals of full and effective exploitation of mineral resources.64  
Courts based the accommodation doctrine on the premise that the 
mineral estate is the dominant estate and demands use of the surface estate 
in order to maximize the value of the mineral estate.65 An easement 
allowing the mineral estate owner to use the surface typically burdens the 
surface estate, which deems it lesser.66 Courts view the accommodation 
doctrine as a happy medium, allowing the dominant estate owner to use the 
servient estate while preventing unbridled use by enforcing liability for 
unreasonable damages to the servient estate.67 The application of the 
accommodation doctrine to groundwater would necessitate the view that the 
surface estate is also servient to the groundwater estate. Texas, however, 
has never applied dominant estate theories to groundwater.68 
III. Statement of the case  
In 1953, the Purtell family, predecessors in interest to Coyote Lake 
Ranch, LLC (“CLR”), conveyed unto the city of Lubbock, Texas (“City”), 
exclusive rights to the groundwater under the land at issue, together with 
the full and exclusive rights of ingress and egress, allowing the City to drill 
                                                                                                                 
 62. SWEPI LP v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 314 S.W.3d 253, 256 (Tex. App.–
Austin 2010).; TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 92.001-.007 (“Mineral Use of Subdivided 
Land”) (explaining that a “[m]ineral estate owner’s use of the surface is limited to . . . only 
as necessary to adequately use the operations sites[,]” and a “[mineral owner] may not alter, 
diminish, or impair the usefulness of an operations site or appurtenant road or pipeline 
easement unless the amendment or replat is approved by the commission.”). 
 63. SWEPI at 256–57. 
 64. Id. at 257, 262. 
 65. A dominant estate “benefits from an easement” because the owner of the dominant 
estate has an interest in, usually in the form of the right to use, another person’s land. Estate, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Miller, supra note 23, at 484. 
 68. City of Lubbock v. Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC, 440 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 
2014). 
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water wells and test wells for ground water exploration and production and 
to construct and maintain water lines, power lines, and access roads, among 
other things, along with the rights to use all of said lands “necessary or 
incidental to the taking” of underground water and “the production, treating 
and transmission of water therefrom.”69 
The parties were cordial until 2012 when the City proposed a well field 
plan and CLR responded with a lawsuit.70 CLR alleged that the master plan 
breached the terms of the original conveyance (“Lubbock Deed”) based on 
locations chosen for at least two of the eighty planned wells, causing 
unreasonable drainage of groundwater used to operate windmills on the 
property.71 CLR also alleged that the City’s mowing practices destroyed the 
grass and caused blowouts by piling sand into dunes, thus prohibiting the 
utilization of the property for grazing.72 The suit entailed four causes of 
action—inverse condemnation, breach of contract, negligence, declaratory 
judgment73—and later, CLR requested a temporary injunction, preventing 
any progress on the master plan until after trial on the causes of action.74 
The trial court granted the temporary injunction, citing CLR’s argument 
that the City failed to indicate (1) the necessity of its well field plan for the 
ranch and (2) that the proposed use of the ranch is the least damaging 
method available: thus, the City did not demonstrate due regard to the 
surface owner, CLR.75 The City appealed, claiming that the trial court 
erroneously applied the accommodation doctrine by enforcing the City to 
pay due regard to CLR beyond the required good faith and fair dealings and 
“reasonably necessary” obligations expected of any contractual 
relationship.76  
IV. Decision of the Case 
The scope of review was limited to the validity of this temporary 
injunction founded on the accommodation doctrine’s applicability to 
groundwater.77 On review, the court dissolved the order and reversed and 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. at 269–270. 
 70. Id. at 270. 
 71. Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v. City of Lubbock, 2013 WL 9924064, at *2 (287th Dist. 
Ct. Bailey County, Tex. Nov. 26, 2013). 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at *2-4. 
 74. City of Lubbock v. Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC, 440 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App.–
Amarillo 2014). 
 75. Coyote Lake Ranch, 2013 WL 9924064, at *4. 
 76. Lubbock, 440 S.W.3d at 270. 
 77. Id. at 274. 
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remanded the trial court’s holding based on a finding of abuse of 
discretion.78 CLR appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.  
V. Analysis79 
The Supreme Court must first decide whether the accommodation 
doctrine is applicable to groundwater and whether the contractual terms and 
obligations of the Lubbock Deed supersede the accommodation doctrine 
analysis before examining the merits of whether the accommodation 
doctrine elements exist within the present facts. This inquiry includes 
recognition of policy implications of applying a new doctrine of obligation 
to the groundwater estate. Applying the accommodation doctrine, the 
surface owner has the burden of proving subsurface estate holder’s activity 
on the surface substantially impairs a pre-existing surface use and that a 
reasonable alternative means of achieving production goals exists that 
would not infringe of the surface estate’s pre-existing use. If the 
accommodation doctrine is not applicable, however, the issues on remand 
would focus on the contractual, volitional rights and obligations of each 
party. 
Was the accommodation doctrine the underlying principle for granting 
temporary injunction? 
The Seventh Court of Appeals concurred with the City that the 
accommodation doctrine was the guiding principle behind the trial court’s 
injunctive order, finding that “CLR seems to agree somewhat.”80 Although 
the trial court’s order does not explicitly name the accommodation doctrine 
and is silent as to any other cause of action, the Texas Rules of Civil 
Procedure require that "[e]very order granting an injunction . . . shall set 
forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms."81 Further, a 
temporary injunction requires a cause of action and a probable right to relief 
sought, but the appellate court held that no right to relief existed where the 
the court granted relief based on the accommodation doctrine, which does 
not apply to groundwater and therefore cannot bestow a right to relief.82 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Id.  
 79. The City raises the issue of whether the Texas Supreme Court has jurisdiction to 
hear this interlocutory appeal regarding the temporary injunction, but that analysis is outside 
the scope of this note. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 12, Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v. 
City of Lubbock, 2013 WL 9924064 (2013). (No. 14-0572). 
 80. Id. at 271. 
 81. Id. (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 683). 
 82. Id.  
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Consequently, the appellate court held that the trial court abused its 
discretion by misapplying the accommodation doctrine to these facts.83 
Courts, however, should review injunctions in light most favorable to the 
injunctive order.84 Here, a light most favorable to the order, if all parties 
acknowledge that the accommodation doctrine was the basis of the order, 
requires the appellate court to perform an in-depth examination at the 
reasonableness of applying the oil and gas doctrine to groundwater. The 
Seventh Court of Appeals does this analysis primarily by distinguishing 
Day, which does not apply the accommodation doctrine or even speak to 
the subsurface estate holder’s rights or the affect those rights may have on 
the surface estate. Day’s analysis of the rule of capture and ownership in 
place, however, are valuable to the peremptory dominant and servient estate 
analysis required of the accommodation doctrine. True comprehensive 
analysis requires more than a citation to Day’s holding alone; instead, the 
Court should have further considered and expanded upon the analogous 
nature of the mineral estate and the groundwater estate before determining 
that the trial court abused its discretion.  
The appellate court’s only analysis outside of Day involved a rejection of 
judicial activism in favor of deference to Texas Congress’s lack of express 
intent that the accommodation doctrine should apply to a groundwater 
estate.85 Although Congress has statutorily applied the accommodation 
doctrine to a mineral estate, the common law application of the 
accommodation doctrine to the mineral estate in the Getty holding 
prompted that action. So although the lower court does not approve of 
judicial activism, judicial action alerted the legislature to the issues between 
the dominant and servient estates in the mineral context, and the legislature 
may require the same prompting here.  
Would the application of the accommodation doctrine negate the City’s 
contractual rights?  
The language of the Lubbock Deed allows 
full and exclusive rights of ingress and egress in, over, and on 
said lands, so that the Grantee of said water rights may at any 
time and location drill water wells and test wells on said lands 
for the purpose of investigating, exploring[,] producing, and 
getting access to percolating and underground water; . . . 
together with the rights to use all that part of said lands 
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necessary or incidental to the taking of percolating and 
underground water and the production, treating and transmission 
of water therefrom and delivery of said water to the water system 
of the City of Lubbock only.86 
 The City argues that this language controls rather than the 
accommodation doctrine because parties can contract out of common law 
doctrines.87 CLR also contends that a contractual relationship could 
contravene a common law doctrine but does not in this case.88 The dispute 
here centers on whether the language of the Lubbock Deed is consistent or 
conflicting with the accommodation doctrine. A 1997 Texas case, Landreth 
v. Melendez, found that a contract allowing surface use “usual, necessary, 
and convenient” to operation negated the accommodation doctrine.89 The 
Lubbock Deed specifically allows any surface use incidental to production 
or transmission of water at any time and location. According to the City, 
this contractual agreement, entered into voluntarily by CLR’s predecessor, 
would also negate the accommodation doctrine and annul CLR’s right to 
enjoin the City from use.  
CLR contends, in contrast, that the Lubbock Deed does not supersede 
accommodation doctrine analysis because, unlike the Landreth deed, the 
Lubbock Deed contemplates damages for harm to the surface estate by the 
City.90 The Lubbock Deed does not contract out of liability for damages to 
the surface estate by any process necessary or incidental to groundwater 
production. In both the Getty deed, which established the accommodation 
doctrine, and the Lubbock Deed, the lessees agreed to pay for damages to 
surface property.91 Although the Lubbock Deed granted full and exclusive 
rights of surface use, lessees still must pay for surface damages that impede 
on the surface owner’s right to use the surface.  
If this distinction applies, dominant estate holders will want contracts 
that explicitly exempt them from damages, as Landreth did, while servient 
estate holders will negotiate for “due regard” surface-use language. The 
Canadian River Municipal Water Authority submitted an amicus brief 
addressing the modern easement and deed forms, which employ 
                                                                                                                 
 86. City of Lubbock v. Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC, 440 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 
2014). 
 87. See supra note 79 at 27 (citing DeWitt City. Elec. Coop, Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 
105 (Tex. 1999). 
 88. Petitioners’s Brief on the Merits at 44, Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v. City of 
Lubbock, 2013 WL 9924064 (2013) (No. 14-0572); 
 89. Landreth v. Melendez, 948 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 1997). 
 90. See supra note 88 at 37, 39. 
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accommodation doctrine language: a savvy surface owner may therefore 
negotiate to opt into the accommodation doctrine. The City’s response 
returns to the conveyance at the heart of the transaction—if both parties 
agree the Lubbock Deed contemplates surface damage liability, the 
expansion of the accommodation doctrine is unnecessary. 
The Court could avoid answering the accommodation doctrine question 
altogether and instead focus on the language of the property conveyance. If 
this is the case, parties to groundwater conveyances should carefully 
consider the language when drafting contracts, as the words within the four 
corners will continue to control the rights and obligations of the parties. If 
the Court instead finds that the accommodation doctrine does apply to 
groundwater, all previous conveyances would be subject to new 
interpretation as many contracts contain less detail than the conveyance at 
issue here.  
If the accommodation doctrine was principle to the injunctive order, was 
there a dominant and servient estate? 
The accommodation doctrine balances the rights between the dominant 
and servient estates. This balance is essential for severed surface and 
subsurface estates because the parties concerned with efficient production 
are not the same parties concerned with preserving the surface for purposes 
outside of production of the subsurface resource.  
The relationship between the dominant mineral estate and the servient 
surface estate is analogous to the relationship between the groundwater 
estate and the surface estate. A grant or retention of subsurface (mineral or 
groundwater) rights would be utterly valueless without a simultaneous grant 
or retention of the right to enter the surface and operate on the land to 
extract the subsurface resource, whether that entails installing pumps and 
storage tanks or constructing roads and pipelines to transport the product on 
and off the property. This rationally follows from the principle of 
ownership in place, which allows the mineral estate owner to possess a 
vested possessory interest in all fugitive resource percolating underground 
in a certain area, and rule of capture, which determines ownership based on 
what the owner removes from the ground. If the ownership cannot take 
place until extraction and the right to extract requires use of a certain area 
where the subsurface estate owner holds no surface rights, the opportunity 
for extraction of a subsurface resource necessitates surface use.  
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The reasonable necessity of the quantity and method of land use requires 
a case-by-case analysis.92 Still, the subsurface conveyance’s depends on 
some privilege of surface use. When the conveying instrument burdens the 
surface estate with an easement, the plain language of the contract which 
transferred the property rights initially determines the scope of the 
easement. Parties are free to contract specific rights, encumbrances, and 
privileges but should contractually acknowledge a servitude on the surface 
estate to the benefit of the subsurface estate because the surface estate 
stands between the subsurface estate holder and the subsurface product. 
Even if the Court neglects to address whether the groundwater and surface 
estates are subject to the dominant and servient estate theory, the two 
estates contractually operate in tandem this way regardless, allowing for 
continued analysis of whether the accommodation doctrine applies to 
balance the rights between the two estates. The City argues that 
groundwater is not a mineral and therefore the accommodation doctrine 
cannot apply93; this argument is irrelevant as the Court did not generate the 
accommodation doctrine specifically for mineral estates but instead to 
balance the rights of the dominant and servient estates. 
What are the repercussions and benefits of applying the accommodation 
doctrine to groundwater? 
Application of the accommodation doctrine may complicate groundwater 
production in a state where groundwater is already subject to heavy 
regulation. Texas groundwater regulations vary from district to district.94 
Because the government established groundwater conservation districts to 
conserve the resource,95 these complications make it more difficult to 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Texas Ag Stats, Texas Department of Agriculture, http://www.texasagriculture.gov/ 
About/TexasAgStats.aspx; Id. at §2(a). 
 93. See supra note 88 at 20; TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 53.1613(a). 
 94. The Texas Water Development Board oversees groundwater management plans 
from 100 conservation districts and two subsidence districts. Groundwater Conservation 
Districts, Texas Water Development Board (2015), https://www.twdb.texas.gov/ 
groundwater/conservation_districts/index.asp  
 95. WEBER, HARDER, & BEARDEN, supra note 3 at 363. (“In 1997, the Texas Legislature 
. . . creat[ed] local districts . . . to require permits . . . for large wells, and to give districts 
authority to regulate water transfers outside their boundaries.”). 
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harvest the groundwater while Texas’ population grows96 and the state 
faces a lack of water supply after extended drought.97  
Despite the potential for complications, CLR argues that Texas courts 
rarely apply the accommodation doctrine—about twenty times since the its 
origin in the Texas Supreme Court.98 The accommodation doctrine “has not 
made a large difference in the ordinary surface use case”99 in Texas because 
a mineral estate owner only must accommodate where other reasonable 
means of operation exist.100  
Further, addressing the accommodation doctrine’s applicability now will 
help both surface and groundwater estate owners establish who possesses 
which rights prior to any future disputes in the face of years of drought and 
increased demand for municipal water supply from the growing population. 
The accommodation doctrine has also successfully managed to balance the 
economic importance of the Texas energy sector with the land needs of the 
state’s growing population. Although Texas leads the oil and gas industry, 
an industry which encourages full development of resources,101 the energy 
sector must still accommodate an existing agriculture use, for example, 
which also plays a huge role in the Texas economy.102 Where the 
accommodation doctrine could would not prohibit groundwater production, 
courts should enforce it to protect existing surface uses in support of a 
diversified Texas economy.  
Regarding the mineral estate, the Texas legislature expanded the 
accommodation doctrine’s protections beyond the existing uses to include 
                                                                                                                 
 96. The population of Texas increased by 1.8 million between the 2010 and 2014 
censuses. Texas, US Census Bureau (Dec. 1, 2015, 4:11 PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/ 
qfd/states/48000.html. 
 97. Dried Out Confronting the Texas Drought, StateImpact, https://stateimpact.npr.org/ 
texas/drought/.  
 98. Rachel Heron, Justin S. Duclos, & Shaun A. Goho, The Interpretation of Surface 
Easements in Severance Deeds as a Limit on Hydraulic Fracturing Practices, 19 BUFF. 
ENVTL. L.J. 73, 98-99 (2012)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. The three-part accommodation doctrine test considers whether “(1) There is an 
existing use by the surface owner; (2) The mineral lessee’s activity would substantially 
impair the existing surface use; and (3) The mineral lessee has a reasonable alternative 
available on the leased premises.” Davis v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 136 S.W.3d 419, 423 
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004). 
 101. 1-3 EUGENE KUNTZ & OWEN ANDERSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 
§3.2 (2015) (“It has also been said that the owner of the surface and the owner of the mineral 
rights have the right to enjoy their respective estates to the highest degree possible not 
inconsistent with the rights of the other.”). 
 102. Texas Ag Stats, Texas Department of Agriculture, http://www.texasagriculture.gov/ 
About/TexasAgStats.aspx.  
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future uses, as well.103 That statute balances the interest of the growing 
population with the interest of the energy industry’s role in the Texas 
economy.104 Should the accommodation doctrine expand to groundwater 
estates, the legislature may consider enacting a similar statute protecting the 
servient estate’s pre-existing and future uses.105 Statutory language 
regarding the accommodation doctrine’s application to groundwater could 
emphasize the need for balancing the growing demand for groundwater in 
light of population growth with the growing concern for the environment in 
light of groundwater depletion. For example, the proposed statute could 
track the language of Texas Natural Resources Code, Section 92.002(3)(A) 
and (C), which both recognize that certain highly populated areas need 
groundwater and surface area for the production thereof; (B) could, 
however, change to reflect a need for compliance with conservation and 
replenishment standards in the area in addition to the zoning requirement.106 
These considerations acknowledge the need to protect the state’s water 
sources without slowing the leasing process because the filing of these 
future protections give adequate notice. A statutory response to the 
adoption of the accommodation doctrine may be a best-case scenario to 
help meet Texas’ future water-supply needs. 
If the accommodation doctrine is not applicable, is the City’s master plan 
beyond the scope of the City’s contractual rights? What are the issues on 
remand?  
If the Court decides the accommodation doctrine does not apply to the 
groundwater estate, CLR must prove that the City breached a term of the 
Lubbock Deed.107 Otherwise, CLR cannot recover damages from conduct 
that CLR contractually authorized. The Lubbock Deed impliedly allows 
mowing as a necessity for access and safety to drill and test wells on the 
property. So CLR has no valid complaint about the City’s choice to drill 
test wells on a particularly sandy area of the property as the deed allows 
wells “at any location” except “within one-fourth (1/4) mile of any of the 
presently existing windmill wells.”108 If any wells are within this explicitly 
prohibited range, this breach may entitle CLR to damages. Further, if CLR 
                                                                                                                 
 103. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 92.001-.007 (“Mineral Use of Subdivided Land”) 
 104. SWEPI, 314 S.W.3d at 256. 
 105. Id. at 257, 262. 
 106. Id. at 256–57. 
 107. Douglas Hale Gross, Annotation, What constitutes reasonably necessary use of the 
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can prove that the location of any well takes groundwater in derogation of 
the rights reserved to CLR by their predecessors in the Lubbock Deed, 
specifically “such quantities of water as may be required to carry on usual 
and normal domestic and ranching operations and undertakings upon said 
lands,” CLR could win another breach of contract claim. Finally, the 
contract did not specifically request below-ground utilities, but it did 
require that the city remove any material that detracts from effective surface 
use by the surface owner; the Court would need to decide whether utility 
lines qualify as clutter and whether serving as a threatened species habitat is 
an effective use of the surface by the owners.109 Even if the City did not 
breach the Lubbock Deed, the conveyance obligates the City to pay for 
surface-use damages, which requires CLR to show damages from the 
checkerboard mowing patterns, overhead power lines, and chosen well 
locations.110 
That outcome will result in parties negotiating compensation for 
damages within the contract. Where water regulatory boards, such as 
groundwater conservation districts, already control spacing and unitization 
of groundwater wells, the need to explicitly describe damages within the 
contract has even greater necessity.111 Surface owners may find that 
groundwater owners will have little motivation to rebuff the implied right to 
use the surface or to agree to damages when Courts refuse to apply the 
accommodation doctrine, which reinforces the implied concept that the 
subsurface estate holder is the dominant estate and owes little to the surface 
estate holder.112  
Along with the breach of contract claims, the trial court would confront 
issues of inverse condemnation and negligence on remand. “Reasonably 
necessary” analysis in contract law intertwines torts principles and property 
law principles. Texas courts have collapsed reasonable necessity into a two-
step test: a court first would consider whether the subsurface estate holder 
acted negligently, thus causing unreasonable harm; and second would 
consider whether the subsurface estate holder acted with reasonable 
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necessity compared to the actions of the prudent business person operating 
for subsurface resources on the surface area.113  
Parties may prove reasonable necessity by showing that the lessee’s use 
of the surface is not reasonably necessary because other non-interfering and 
reasonable alternatives exist.114 While this analysis is eerily similar to the 
accommodation doctrine analysis, the accommodation doctrine requires 
conflicting surface uses while the reasonably necessary analysis considers 
only the lessee’s surface use.115 In deciding against the accommodation 
doctrine, a court should consider the (1) lack of incentive to respect surface 
rights because of the reasonable necessity analysis, which grants broad 
rights but does not consider harm to the surface estate; (2) the difficulties in 
predictive contracting, and (3) the unequal bargaining power of the lessor in 
surface contract negotiations. 
How does the accommodation doctrine apply to the present facts?  
If the accommodation doctrine applies, the Court will sustain the 
temporary injunction if CLR can prove that the City substantially impaired 
CLR’s existing surface use and had an alternative to the harmful action. 
Regarding the soil blowouts from the mowing and the test wells, CLR must 
prove negative effects on its cattle grazing and that an alternative mowing 
pattern or well locations would have prevented damage. The alternative 
mowing pattern likely would not take more money, nor would it take much 
more time, but the accommodation doctrine disbars inconvenience to the 
dominant estate holder from the list of valid reasons that proposed 
alternatives are unworkable. The City dragged equipment with tractors 
across the sandy area to access the water wells, disintegrating the sandy soil 
even more and creating deeper ruts in the surface. Although it may cost 
more or take more time to develop a different means to transport the 
equipment, the City would still have to accommodate the surface owner if 
the court, in a balancing test, finds that the surface owner’s damages 
outweigh the inconvenience to the groundwater estate owner in utilizing the 
alternative means.116 Finally, the overhead power lines prevent CLR from 
obtaining stipends for serving as a habitat to threatened species. A court 
would have to determine whether this is an existing use first, based off the 
time of the conveyance; if it is, then CLR would prove that less harmful 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Gross, supra note 107 (citing Wolhford v. American Gas Production Co. 218 F.2d 
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means exist, such as burying power lines. Because it is questionable 
whether this was an existing use, this is the least likely of the three claims 
to benefit from the application of the accommodation doctrine.  
The accommodation doctrine is a more flexible alternative to a surface 
damages act. Yet a surface damages act protects a surface owner who 
generally has less bargaining power to negotiate liability prior to the 
contract, and it is more predictable and uniform than analyzing surface 
damages claims on a conveyance-by-conveyance basis. Parties, however, 
value the freedom to contract in these types of property conveyances rather 
than a uniform statutory mandate. 
VI. Recommendations and Conclusion  
The parties have stipulated that the basis of the temporary injunction is 
the applicability of the accommodation doctrine, and resolution of the case 
will involve a decision on the application of the accommodation doctrine to 
groundwater estates. Although the appellate court did not review the trial 
court’s injunction in a light most favorable to the order by not fully 
analyzing the merits of applying the accommodation doctrine to a 
groundwater estate, the appellate court upheld its sense of judicial integrity 
by refusing to partake in judicial activism and instead deferring to the 
state’s high court or legislature for resolution.  
The groundwater estate operates as a dominant estate because utilization 
of the groundwater rights necessitates encumbering the surface estate. 
Because these two estates operate in tandem, it is equitable for the 
dominant estate, which requires use of the surface, to accommodate the 
existing surface uses as long as the accommodation does not hinder the 
dominant estate’s rights and privileges. The accommodation doctrine, 
which only requires the dominant estate to change its means of operation 
where there exists a reasonable alternative that still allows total use of the 
groundwater rights, will make groundwater production inconvenient, but 
not impossible. The need to conserve a valuable natural resource validates, 
or even necessitates, these complications in groundwater production, just as 
the increased groundwater regulations since the 1940s have been 
justified.117  
Not only is Texas suffering from groundwater depletion, but Texas also 
chooses to treat groundwater as a real property interest. Therefore, 
regulatory bodies should hold owners of a groundwater estate responsible 
for unnecessary groundwater use which negatively affects adjacent 
landowners.  This regulation also allows for economic prosperity in other 
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areas, namely agriculture, where the surface owner has full and efficient use 
of land. This consideration of servient estates changes the past century of 
court decisions favoring the property interest of the groundwater estate 
owner rather than deferring to the conservation districts.  
Regardless of how the Court decides the issue, the legislature can 
statutorily expand on the common law, prohibit the common law, or codify 
it in exact terms used by the judiciary. The “what if” of a statutory 
expansion of the common law doctrine is not any more valid than the “what 
if” of the legislative repercussions following any judicial decision. Still, 
courts should recognize that the adoption of the doctrine could encourage 
the legislature to respond in support of conservation.   
Application of the accommodation doctrine to groundwater estates also 
would not impede the freedom to contract. Voluntary consent to duties and 
privileges would be valid but read in light of the accommodation doctrine’s 
due regard requirement. Therefore, the Court should both adopt the 
accommodation doctrine and expand on the contractual language that could 
allow parties to contract out of accommodation doctrine liability. The 
Lubbock Deed, in which the City explicitly assents to pay for surface 
damages, complies with the accommodation doctrine because the 
accommodation doctrine allows continued production and use to the fullest 
extent but may impose duties or financial obligations on the dominant 
estate holder. The Deed permits the City to use the land “at any time and 
location” and in any way “necessary or incidental” to production or 
transportation, but must do so with due regard for the surface estate by 
occasionally modifying its methods. Finally, because the accommodation 
doctrine will force groundwater estate owners to operate with due regard, 
they may become more willing to participate in upfront negotiation of terms 
regarding surface use. 
Because groundwater is physically and legally more analogous to 
subsurface minerals, Texas groundwater policy must catch up with Texas 
oil and gas policy. Texas created the accommodation doctrine, and many 
other states followed suit in adopting this doctrine to balance the rights 
between surface owners and mineral owners. The application of this 
doctrine to other subsurface resources, such as groundwater, will be 
influential to other states and demonstrates a priority on economic 
development that does not otherwise detract from the value of groundwater 
production; rather, the decision to adopt this oil and gas policy for 
groundwater may enlighten the masses that the oil and gas mantra of full 
production is inefficient, or even wasteful, when applied to groundwater.   
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